Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1978

Elizabeth Weeks v. Cerola Dansie Calderwood et al
: Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
John M. CHipman; Attorney for Third-Party Defendant-Respondent;
Stephen G. Morgan; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent;
Craig M. Snyder; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Weeks v. Calderwood, No. 15671 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1123

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

,. '"-i

APPEAL FROM A ~~~~~!j
SPECIAL vBRDIC!l'
COURT OF SAL'f
HONORABLE

STEPHEN G. MORGAN
345 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for DefendantRespondent
JOHN M. CHIPMAN
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Third Party
Defendant-Respondent

,,

. '·-

FILF..D
MAY 1 0 1978

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization ----··------·-------provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Co:.~ri,
Ut.1h
Library Services and Technology Act, administeredCior~.
by theSu;:>rOl':'la
Utah State
Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELIZABETH \'lEEKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CEROLA DANSIE CALDERWOOD,

Case No. 15,671

Defendant-Respondent,
vs.
CONSTANCE E. PATTON ZARBOCK,
Third Party DefendantRespondent.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
APPEAL FROt1 A JUDG!'1ENT ENTERED ON A JURY'S
SPECIAL VERDICT BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COU!~·ry, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, JUDGE
CRAIG M. SNYDER, for:
HO\>lARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
STEPHEN G. MORGAN
345 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for DefendantRespondent
JOHN H. CHIPt·iAN
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Third Party
Defendant-Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT ON APPEAL

5

STAT&~ENT

POINT I

5

THE VERDICT WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT
· BECAUSE AN AWARD OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
CANNOT BE MADE WITHOUT AN AWARD OF
GENERAL DAMAGES WHERE SUCH HAVE BEEN
PROVEN
POINT II

9

THE COURT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR
OR DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN SPECIAL
DAMAGES AND GENERAL DAMAGES IN THE
SPECIAL VERDICT FORH WAS LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT, CONFUSING TO THE JURY
AND CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR
POINT III

10

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE REQUIRED
TO ASSESS INTEREST ON THE PLAINTIFF'S
SPECIAL DAMAGES AS A MATTER OF PROCEDURAL LAW AND THE FAILURE TO DO SO IS
CAUSE FOR RElfffiND
POINT IV

14

THE FACTS OF THIS CASE INDICATE THAT
THE VERDICT WAS GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE,
RESULTING IN INADEQUATE DAMAGES BEING
AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF
POINT V

16

THE COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE
CONFUSING AND IMPROPER DUE TO REPETITION WHICH WAS CARRIED TO THE POINT
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

OF PLACING UNDUE EMPHASIS TO THE DEFENDANTS' POSITIONS ON BOTH FACTS AND
THE LAW
CONCLUSION
CASES CITED
Addy v. Stewart, 69, Idaho 357, 207 P.2d 498 ll949),
75 Am.Jur. 2d 597 Trial, §630
Ballog v. Knight Newspapers, Inc., (1969), 381 Mich.
527, 164 N.W. 2d 19 • • • • • • • • • •
Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363 (Okla. 1973) • •
Boden v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 72, 327 P.2d 826 (1958)
Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306 (Utah, 1975)
Crowe v. Sacks, 283 P.2d 689 (Cal, 1955)

.

Fields v. Volkswagen, 555 P.2d. 48 (Okla., 1976)
Land v. York Oil Corporation, 280 S.W.2d 628 (1955,
Tex. Civ. App.) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Langton v. International Transport Co., 26 Utah 2d 452,
491 P.2d 1211 (1971)
••.•••••••.•
Marquess v. Taylor, 331 P.2d 879, 214 Or. 619 (1958)
M. E. Trapp Associated v. Tankersley, 206 Okl.
118, 240 P.2d 1091.
(1951) • . . . .
People v. Union Oil Company of California, 310 P.2d
409 (1957) • • • . • . . . . . . . • .
Sparks v. Berntsen, 112

P.2d 742, 19 Cal.2d 308 (1941).

Spur Feeding Company v. Fernandez, 472 P.2d 12. 106
Ariz. 143, 49 ALR.3d 925, (1970)
Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

AUTHORITIES CITED
20 A.L.R.2d 276 •

6

47 A.L.R.3d 1299

16

•,

49 A.L.R.3d 970 •

17

RULES CITED
Rule 47(r), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1953,
as amended) . • • • • .
• • • • • • • . •

7,8,21

Rule 59 (a) (5) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1953,
.,
as amended).

8

Rule 59 (a) (6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1953,
as amended).

14

.....
..

. .

.. ......
.. . . .. ...

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-44 (1953, as amended)

• . • 9, 10, 11, 21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUP~

IN THE

COURT

OF THE STA'l'E OF UTAH
ELIZABETH WEEKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CEROLA DANSIE CALDERWOOD,

Case No. 15,671

Defendant-Respondent,
vs.
CONSTANCE E. PATTON ZARBOCK,
Third Party DefendantRespondent.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in tort for personal injuries alleged
to have been caused the plaintiff, Elizabeth Weeks, who was
a passenger in the second car of a four car chain reaction
type collision which occurred at the 45th South Northbound
on-ramp to I-15 on February 1, 1974 at approximately 7:30
a.m.

The appellant claims that the defendant, Cerola Dansie

(Calderwood) and third-party defendant, Constance Elizabeth
Patton Zarbock negligently caused the injuries complained of
in the complaint.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury in the Third Judicial
District Court on December 5, 6 and 7, 1977.
were submitted to
-------~-- --

~he_jury

The issues

on a Special Verdict form and the
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jury found that the defendant, Cerola Dan:l:.se lCalde;r;woodl
was 100%

negl~gent,

wh:j:ch negligence was a

prox~ate

cause of

the plaintiff's injuries, and assessed the amount of plaintiff's
damages at $2,596.42 which was the total amount of plaintiff's
special damages listed on plaintiff's Exhibit 3.

The defendant,

Constance Patton Zarbock was found 0% negligent (R. 228).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the judgment of the trial court
vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial.

Appellant

further seeks an order from this court allowing interest on
the amount of plaintiff's claimed special damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of February 1, 1974 at approximately
7:30a.m.,

(Tr. 443), appellant, Elizabeth Weeks, was involved

in an automobile accident while on her way to work.

The

accident occurred at the 45th South northbound on-ramp to I15 in Salt Lake County.

(Tr. 635).

Four cars were involved

in the accident, which was of the chain reaction collision
type.

The last of the four cars, which was driven by Cerola

Dansie (Calderwood), hit the car directly behind appellant,
which car was driven by Constance Patton Zarbock, and impelled
that car into the car in which appellant was a passenger.
The car in which appellant was riding was pushed into a
truck directly in front of appellant as a result of the
impact from behind.

(Tr. 641-642).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant in

~er

amended

comp~aint

t~.,

229-23lt,

claimed damages for injuries sustained as a result of the
accident against the defendant, Cerola Dansie (Calderwood}
and also against the Third-Party Defendant, Constance Patton

-------

Zarbock. Appellant also claimed special damages and interest
on any special damages pursuant to §78-27-44 U.C.A.

(1953,

as amended) •
During the trial, appellant offered expert medical
testimony to the effect that she had not only suffered great
pain, expense and loss of the ability to perform certain acti
vities, but also sustained permanent disability from the
injuries suffered in the accident.
At the conclusion of both plaintiff's and the respective
defendants' cases, the Court discussed the jury instructions
with counsel in chambers.

Many of the plaintiff's requested

instructions were refused.
After returning from lunch the jury -retired
at approxirna
----·1
2:00p.m. to begin its deliberations and then returned at

-

approximately 2:25p.m. with its verdict (R. 695). The jury
-----·-- - - . -~-~ -- -.
found the defendant, Cerola Dansie (Calderwood) was 100%
negligent and that her negligence was a proximate cause of
the injuries complained of by the plaintiff.

They

f~und

no

negligence on the part of the Third-Party Defendant, Constanc'
Patton Zarbock.

The jury awarded $2,596.42 in damages which

was the exact amount of the appellant's special damages (R.
228 and plaintiff's exhibit 3).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'
r

The following specific objections were Illade to the
Court's instructions and its

refusal to give
fori~~

requested jury instructions and

pl~inttff'~

the basis for this

appeal:
1)

Objection to court's refusal of instructions 4

and 5 which directed a finding of negligence against both
defendants.
2)

pp. Tr 692, 693.
Objection to the form of the special verdict

---------

on the grounds that question number 4 should have detailed

.,.---·- ....------·---·

-- .

. --~-

-

both general and special damages in order to allow accurate

.. -----"-.

~~---~--

-------~

apportionment
of such. Tr. 693, 694.
•
·-~- _._......__ ____ _, _Ti
3)

Objections of the court's instructions 1, 5,

7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19 and 21 on the grounds that
the instructions were repetitious and placed an undue burden
on plaintiff through reemphasis.

Tr 694, 695.

The Court submitted it's inst~u~~-~~~s to the jury ~n~
with a special verdict form containing four written interrogatories:-- (R., 228)

This special verdict form did not

allow for a differentiation between general and special
damages.

Specifically, special verdict question no. 4 read:

"What is the total amount of damages sutained by the plaintiff,
Elizabeth \'leeks, as a result of the accident:

$ _ _ _ _ _ __

Appellant objected both at the time of the in-chambers
conference and on the record after the jury had been instructed,
and while the jury was at lunch, prior to retiring to begin
its deliberations, to the instructions actually given by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Court and to the form of the SJ?ecial verdict.

(_T;r. 690-

695).

After returning from lunch, the jury retired and deliberated for approximately 25 minutes.

The special verdict

rendered assessed 100% liability to Cerola Dansie (Calderwood)
and 0% liability to Constance E. Patton Zarbock.

The amount

of damages awarded was $2,596.42, the exact figure which
appellant presented as the total of her special damages.
The appellant also made a motion, after the jury had
returned it's verdict, for an additur (Tr. 697-698) on the
grounds that the jury had only awarded special damages and
that an award of special damages cannot be made without an
award of general damages and later made a Motion For
Trial (R, 239-240) both of which was denied.

a Hew

Plaintiff-

appellant now takes this appeal.
ARGU~lliNT

ON APPEAL

POINT I
THE VERDICT WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIEi'IT BECAUSE AN AWARD OF
SPECIAL DAMAGES CANNOT BE MADE WITHOUT AN AWARD OF GENERAL
DAl>iAGES WHERE SUCH HAVE BEEH PROVEN.
As is previously indicated, the award of damages made ~
the jury equalled the amount plaintiff claimed as special d~
to the penny.

(See plaintiff's Exhibit 3).

It is extremely

unlikely that the jury would come up with that particular
figure,

$2,596.42, unless they were simply awarding the pla~

the special damages she proved at trial.

It is conceded, of
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-

course, that because of the form of the special verd~ct, ~0 one
can say for sure what was, being awarded by· the jury.

The law

is clear in this jurisdiction and in the 23 jurisdictions
that have ruled on the subject that an award of only special
damages where there is proof of general damages is inadequate
as a matter of law.

Cohn v. J.

c.P~~Y.

Co., 537 P.2d 306

(Utah, 1975); Langton v. International Transport Co., 26
Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211 (1971); Boden v. Suhrmann, 8
Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958).

(See also the annotation of

this Point at 20 A.L.R. 2d 276 and the cases cited in the
Later Case Service.)
The Langton and Cohn cases involve situations where the
verdict forms requ~~e~~e j \lEX-.~_ !P.:=~ifx_ separate 1 y ·general and
special damages.

In both cases, the jury
,.._--~4 -~=---'---

-·

.a-.w<!_r_d,~_zero

($~~

---· ---

general damages and some amount as special damages.

In both

.......

cases, the Utah Supreme Court held that such an_ __.. award
was
_-_..,_.
---~

--·-)

improper.
In the Langton case, which was an action for personal
injuries, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant and assessed no general damages
but $868.25 special damages and $600.00 property damage, the
Court stated:
In the instant case, it must be conceded that if the plaintiff were entitled to an
award of special damages, he was entitled to
be compensated, under the evidence, for pain
and suffering and a loss of 22-1/2 days' wages
irrespective of prospective damages which the
jury and the trial court evidently doubted.
Obviously the jury failed to consider these
items of damage. The verdict was defective
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in form in that it did not comprehend all the
items of damage contained in the instructions
given by the court, it was therefore insufficient.
491 P.2d at 1214.
In that case, the fact that the jury did not consider
or award any amount as general damage was obvious on the
face of the verdict form.

The verdict form had a line for
-...~·-..·----

general damages, a line for

-- ----

speci~l.d~agee,

and a--.._
line
for
... .._,__---,
~

property damage.

The jury entered the word "none" on the

___.._....

line for general damages.

The Utah Supreme Court stated, as

is quoted above, that such an award is defective on its
face.

Such a defect in form must be corrected, according to

the Supreme Court in that case, pursuant to Rule 47(r) by
sending the jury out to redeliberate and correct their
obvious error.

(See Langton, supra. 491 P.2d at 1215.)

While a logical analysis of the jury's award in this
case leads one to the conclusion that the jury in the instant
case also

neglected to make any award for general damages,

_________________________

the
....._ verdict as rendered by the jury
-- has no defect on its
face.

~--

The jury verdict was regular according to the definiti

given in the Langton case.

In Langton this Court said:

"The verdict was defective in form in that it did
not comprehend all the items of damage contained
in the instructions given by the court, it was
therefore, insufficient."
491 P.2d at 1214.
The jury verdict given in the instant case did comprehend
all the items of damage listed on the special verdict form
submitted to the jury.

Langton, supra, Sparks v. Bernston,

112 P.2d 742, 19 Cal.2d 308 (1941), Crowe v. Sacks, 283 P.2c
689, 692

(Cal. 1955).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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but

,,~~~
Rule 59 (_a)_ l5 )_ applies.

~ule

5.9la)_ (?)_, U.~.C.J>., states that

a new trial may be granted where the verdict prov~des:
(_5) excessive or inadequate damages, appearing
to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
In distinguishing when the jury must be sent out to
redeliberate before discharge pursuant to Rule 47{.r} or whether a
new trial is to be granted pursuant to Rule 59(a) (5), the
Supreme Court in Langton, supra, stated:
There is a basic distinction between an
insufficient or informal verdict and a verdict
regular on its face, which awards inadequate
damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice. Rule 59(a)
(5).
In the latter case, a new trial must be
granted to correct the error. In the former
case, counsel has an opportunity to assert an
objection and the court, under Rule 47 {.r),
U.R.C.P., may return the jury for further
deliberation and further instruction to correct
the irregularity. 491 P.2d at 1215.
Counsel for appellant objected to the form of the Special

-· -·

Verdict as indicated previously.

----

The jury verdict carne back

on the Special Verdict form with the blank for plaintiff's
"damages" clearly filled out and a figure inserted.
Counsel for appellant then immediately called the matter
to the attention of the Court and indicated tha!_Ee_~i~yed
it was the law that .. a jury could _not ':ward _s12=.::ial _dama~es
without an award of general damages as well.

(Tr. 697-698) ·

The Court then requested counsel to submit a written motion
and memorandum in connection with the matters raised by
plaintiff's counsel.

(Tr, 698)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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l?OJNT :0:
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR OR DIFFERENTIATE
SPECIAL DAMAGES

Al.~D

GENERAL DAMAGES IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT FOI

WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT CONFUSING TO THE JURY AND CONSTITUTru
REVERSIBLE ERROR.

The court must provide separate blanks for amounts of
general and special damages so
-( differentiate between
(

th~t

the jury may properly

specia~ and_9~~~ra~_damages

and award

both
general
and special
__.._ . :
·--· damages.
_,_ .._.
'
~

_

~----

·~-·--.

-~

Such a differentiation is required by statute.
78-27-44 U.C.A.

Section

(1953) permits the plaintiff in a personal in

action to recover interest of eight (8%) percent per annum on
the award of any special damages by the judge or jury.

Where

the plaintiff claims this interest, as the appellant did in
--. ~~-~· .. ----- -~------- this case, (See Amended Complaint (R. 229-231), the Court is
~----··

?

bound to require the jury to set forth special damages sep-

-----

arately.

The plaintiff requested that the Court require the jury
state both the special and general damages separately, on thr
separate occasions:
{1)
Verdict form.
(2}

Plaintiff's requested jury instructions - SpM
(R. 223, 223).
At the in-chambers conference between the cou:

and respective counsel.
(3)

During the exceptions taken to the jury

by plaintiff's counsel (Tr., 692-693).

in~r

Counsel for appellan

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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w• #

U#W.

2 J$ !S.JQ$ d.hQij

given the jury, expressing his concern that the:. jury would~ be
confused and would enter an ward of specials only on the
Special Verdict form.

(Tr, 692, 693).

The fact that the amount awarded as damages by the
jury, $2,596.42, is exactly the amount claimed by appellant
in her Exhibit #3, entitled "Summary of Medical Specials",
strongly indicates that the jury awarded only special damages.
Because the special verdict form did not require the jury to
differentiate between general and special damages, however, it is
impossible to know for certain what elements of damage the
jury considered in making it's award.
Due to the impossibility of ascertaining the precise
amount of the award of special damages, it makes it difficult
for the court to assess interest against the award.
be explained more fully in a subsequent point.

As will

Appellant

contends that she is entitled to an award of interest on her
special damages and the inability of the court to grant this
claim constitutes reversible error and denies a right given to her
by statute.

(See §78-27-44 U.C.A.

ll953), as amended.)

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ASSESS INTEREST
Oi~

LAW

THE PLAINTIFF'S SPECIAL DAHAGES AS A MATTER OF PROCEDURAL
At~D

THE FAILURE TO DO SO IS CAUSE FOR REMAND.

The controversy over the award of interest on the
special damages arises because the cause of action in the
instant
case occurred in 1974 while the section which allows
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the award of

tnte~est

the Utah State

on

specia~

Le9islat~J;e ~ntil

1>y,

dama9es was not enacted
1975.

The governin9 section, 7 8-2 7-4 4 , U. C • A.

(19 53 , as amendel

reads as follows:
"In all actions brought to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained by any
person, resulting from or occasioned by the
tort of any other person, corporation,
association or partnership, whether by negligence or willful intent of that other
person, corporation, association or partnership, and whether that injury shall have
resulted fatally or otherwise, it shall be
lawful for the plaintif( ,!!!__~he s;ompla~~!-~ t:.o
cra1m 1.nterest on the spe~iaJ,.damages ~leged
from the date of the occurrence of the act ·
giving· rise to The -cause of action and it
snail fie- tEe CI"uty~ o£ the court: in enterTng
judgment for plaintiff in that action, to add
to the amount of damages assessed by the ver
diet of the jury, or found by the court, interest on that amount calculated at 8S per annum
from the date of the occurrence of the act
giving rise to the cause of action to the date
of entering the judgment, and to include it in
that judgment."
(Emphasis added)
It is the duty of the court, in entering the judgment,

t

add interest thereon.
The section uses general language and does not specifica
say whether the section is to apply to judgments which are
rendered after the effective date of the section whose
underlying cause of action accrues prior to the statute's
--~

-

---~

effective date.
This court has not had an opportunity to make a ruling
on the application of this statute to the facts of this case
The question of whether an interest statute giving 6%
on special damages in personal injury cases in Oklahoma
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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shou

be applied retrospectively was directly before the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. The Oklahoma statute differed from the Utah
statute in the time when the interest begins to accrue,
which in Oklahoma is from the time the suit is brou~~' and
which in Utah is the time the cause of action accrues.

This

difference is not pertinent to the rule of law laid down by
the Oklahoma courts.
The court in Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363 (Okla, 1973)
stated:
"A question, then, is whether there is in
12 O.S. 1971, §727, subd. 2. a legislative
intent, clearly expressed, or necessarily
implied from the language used that requires
1. consideration, and 2. retrospective application, of the 6% interest matter. We think
that there is. That the legislature may, in
its discretion, establish interest that will
accrue on a judgment, is, of course, recognized. Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon
Corp., supra. That the "interest" here has
the effect of damages does not affect the matter.
Like costs, interest is recoverable by statute
(Baldwin v. Collins, (Okl. 1970), 479 P.2d
567), and the_l~~~slatur~ .h<!~ .9Q_prescribed
it.
It- is attached by legislative fg:L (Foster v: Quigley, (19621,94 R.I. -211; 179 A.2d
494--a retrospective intere~t_c~se~ ~e),
and is proper. Not being of the substance of
the right of action (Foster v. Quigley, supra),
but being a directive to the trial court, then
it becomes a mode of procedure which the court
was bound to follow.
Since judgments bear interest as prescribed by
12 O.S. 1971, § 727, subd.
2. although the
judgments make no provision theref~r, and it
being a ministerial duty to award 1nter~st
in proper cases, an erroneous award ~f 1nterest
on a judgment may be corrected by th1s cou:r:t
on appeal even though the error was not ra1sed
in the motion for new trial or petition in error."
(515 P.2d at 1365).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In another Oklahoma case the facts were analogous to
the appellant's case.

The suit was commenced March 29,

1971 (the statutory time for the beginning of interest
accrual) but
1971.

~he

statute was not approved until June 16,

A verdict was returned in July 6, 1973 and the

court refused to add interest.

~al

On appeal the Oklahoma Supret

Court said that it would follow Benson v. Blair, supra, in
allowing interest because the adding of interest was procedm
rather

than substantive and must be allowed where the

statute is in effect at the time the judgment is rendered.
(See Fields v. Volkswagen, 555 P.2d. 48 (Okla., 1.976 at 63),
For other cases holding similarly see:
Inc.,

Ballog v. Knight Ne.:

(1969), 381 Mich. 527, 164 N.W. 2d 19, M.E. Trapp Asso

ated v. Tankersly 206 Okl. 118, 240 P.2d 1091.

(1941).

In a case dealing with interest on refunds of tax
franchise payments, the California Supreme Court in People

o:

State of California v. Union Oil Company of California, 310
P. 2d 409 (1957), held:
"A statutory interest right for a particular
period depends upon the law in effect at
that time . . . Accordingly, plaintiff concedes defendant's right to the interest on
over payments for the period prior to July
10, 1947, the effective date of the amendment."
(See page 412).
(Emphasis added)
In conclusion, the statutory right to interest is a pfi
legislative mandate and requires the giving of interest if
the statute is in effect at the time the judgment was ren~
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POINT IV
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE INDICATE THAT THE

YE~ICT

WAS GIVEN

UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE, RESULTING IN
INADEQUATE DN•ffiGES BEING AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF.
Rule 59(a) (6), provides that where there is evidence of
some prejudice or improper consideration by the jury leading to
an award of excessive or inadequate damages, the Court has
broad discretion to grant a new trial.

e/. ~ ~J ~

In considering the decision to grant a new trial, the Court
is empowered to exercise its discretion and judgment, taking into
....
----~consideration matters which go beyond strict questions of law.

------ -

In commenting on this function of the trial court, the Utah
Supreme Court said in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d
701 (1961) that the trial court may properly order a new trial
--------~

~

when:
. . it seems clear that the jury had
misapplied or failed to take into account
the proven facts; or misunderstood or
disregarded the law; or made findings
clearly against the weight of the evidence.
(citations omitted).
Such test depends
largely upon the reaction and judgment of
the trial judge." 12 Utah 2d at 354. See
also Paul v. Kirkendall, 261 P.2d 670
(1953).
Appellant urges to this court that the District Court
abused it's discretion by failing to grant a new trial or in
the alternative an additur because of the clear evidence that
the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice in that they
did not believe that the defendants were covered by insurance,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and thus lessened the amqunt

o~

theLr

aw~rd.

U>ee a,f ;eidavit

of appellant's counsel, R. 236-238).
The attorney for

pl~intiff

herein has filed an affidavit

setting forth the particular facts which indicate prejudice
on the part of the jury.
In paragraph 5 of said affidavit, counsel indicates
that solely by chance, he and the attorney for one of the
defendants overheard a portion of the conversation in which
members of the jury expressed concern as to whether or not

---"

the defendants had insurance.

The jurors expressed the

belief that the defendant did not have insurance.

The

verdict awarded by the jury is obviously inadequate in that
it does

not compensate the plaintiff for any amount of

general damage, i.e., pain, suffering or disability.

The

amount of time which the jury took to deliberate was very
limited, at most 20 to 25 minutes.
The facts of this case set forth above indicate that it
is highly more probable that the jury's verdict was the
result of their fear that the defendants did not have any
insurance and could not withstand a judgment for the full
amount of the damages which the plaintiff had sustained
rather than a finding that the amount a\varded was, in fact,
the full extent of the plaintiff's damages.

In such a

situation, justice and fairness clearly calls for a new
trial.
This court has not directly considered the issue of
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insurance may constitute grounds for a new trial.

In the

case of Land v. York Oil Corporation, 280 S.W.2d 628 (1955,
~~!' ;~v. AJtp.), it was shown that some members of the jury

had discussed and speculated upon defendants' possible lack
of insurance.

The court, in discussing the question of

insurance, said:
"This wholly immaterial matter was made
a subject of improper speculation, the
court ruled, and took place while the
jury was deliberating upon the issue
.regarding the liability of the defendant." 47 ALR.3d 1299 at Section 14,
p. 1342.
The court also found that the discussion was prejudicial because
it was not casual and because there was no evidence of a timely
warning or rebuke by another member of the jury.

(47 ALR.3d 1342)

The affidavit by appellant's counsel shows that the
jury in this case was making improper speculations with
regard where the defendants had liability insurance.

The

fact that these speculations were prejudicial to the appellant
is evidenced by the fact that the jury failed to give any
award for pain, suffering or disability all of which were in
evidence at the trial.
In this situation, the Supreme Court has authority to
review the exercise of the trial court's discretion and to grant
a new trial.
POINT V
THE COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTIONS lvERE CONFUSING AND IMPROPER
DUE

'ro REPETITION \vHICH \vAS CARRIED TO THE POINT OF PLACING
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UNDUE EMPHASIS TO THE DEFENDANTS' POSITIONS ON BOTR PACTS

~·D

,

THE LAW.

The general rule is stated in the case of Spur Feeding
Company v. Fernandez, 472 P.2d 12, 106 Ariz. 143, 49 ALR.3d
925,

(1970).

The Court said:

"Ordinarily a trial court should not
single out any particular or individual
factual aspect of litigation for special
instructions since there is that danger that
the jury may unduly attach significance to
it • • • : 472 P.2d at 17.
The Idaho GOUrts have held that repetition of one theory, or
of one view or aspect of the case is not approved where the
effect is to give undue

prominence or emphasis to such theory

view, as against others which the jury must also weigh.
Stewart, 69

Addyv.

Idaho 357, 207 P.2d 498 (1949), 75 Am.Jur 2d

Trial -597 §630.
It is also improper to submit instructions to the jury
which unduly emphasizes the burden upon the plaintiff.

c:

In

the case of Marquess v. Taylor, 331 P.2d 879, 214 Or. 619
(1958) the court criticized repetitious jury instructions
given in the case saying:
. . • we feel impelled to mention that
the instructions were repetitious and
unduly emphasized the burden upon
plaintiff. p. 882
The above case dealt with improper jury instructions concerni~
contributory negligence in an automobile personal injury
case, but the principle of placing an unfair burden on the
plaintiff through repetition is particularly applicable in
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the instant case because the prejudice went not to a particular
element of the case but to the general burden of proof to be
carried by the plaintiff.
In illustration of the undue emphasis placed upon the
appellant and her burden of proof, the following exerpts
from the jury instructions are cited:
Instruction No. 11 - "The burden is on the
party making a claim or defense to prove
the essential elements of her claim by a
preponderance of the evidence."
(R., 129)
.Instruction No. 12 - "The party upon whom
the burden of proof rests must sustain it
by a preponderance of the evidence. If
the evidence does not preponderate in favor
of the plaintiff making the charge of negligence, then she has failed to fulfill
her burden of proof . • • " (R., 130)
Instruction No. 13 - "Before you may find
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against
either defendant in this case, you must
find from a preponderance of the evidence
. • . The burden of proof is likewise upon
the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence her damage."
(R., 131)
Instruction 18 contains reiterations
of the burden of proof which plaintiff had
to meet at the trial.
(R., 136)
Instruction 19 - "The burden is upon the
parties claiming damages to prove by a
preponderance or greater weight of the
evidence the amount of their injuries or
damages reasonably and naturally flowing
from such injuries. The burden likewise
rests upon the parties claiming damages
to establish by a preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence the nature, character
and extent of her suffering or injury and the
duration thereof." (R. 137)
A complete reading of the above instructions shows that
the instructions are not simply clarifying in nature and are
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repetitious to the point of being prejudicial.

The instruct!

do not simply define what a preponderance of the evidence
is, they repeat and unduly emphasize the plaintiff's burden
of proof.
The prejudice resulting from the undue emphasis on
plaintiff-appellant's burden or proof was increased by the
fact that the Court made little mention of respondent's
burden of proving their allegations while it continually
mentioned plaintiff-appellant's burden.
The Court also placed undue emphasis on the point of
not indulging in speculation or conjecture.

See Instructions

Numbered 1 and 12 (R. 119, 130).
The over emphasis on speculation and conjecture placed
an undue burden by creating an inference that the plaintiff's
case was at least in part based on speculation, or conjecture.
This was particularly crucial with regard to plaintiff's
ongoing future damages.

At the time of the trial, the

plaintiff was continuing to suffer severe pain and a restrictE
activity schedule.

There was testimony that plaintiff's

injuries and disabilities would continue on for some indef~~
period of time.

In assessing general damages the jury would

have to reduce the damages to their present value.

This

reduction to present value requires a jury deliberation
process which is somewhat analogous to speculation or conject
and any undue emphasis on the concept of guessing, approxima·
or speculating will always be prejudicial to a plaintiff w~
has continuing injury and damage as it was in this case.
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The remainder of the jury instructions are repetitious
and burdensome, though they are not patently prejudicial as
are the above mentioned jury instruction.

(See ~R. 1, 11, 12

13, 18 and 19).
The result of the undue emphasis upon certain aspects of
the case is that appellant was denied a fair trial.

The

fact

that no general damages were apparently given shows that the
jurors did attach undue significance to the improper instructions
and under all the facts and circumstances appellant should be
granted a new trial.
CONCLUSION
It is, perhaps, significant to note that both the
plaintiff's Special Verdict form (R. 222-223) and the defendant,
Cerola Dansie (Calderwood's) Special Verdict Form (R. 224225) requested that the court set forth general and special
damages separately.

These requests were denied by the court

and the Special Verdict form requested by the Third-Party
Defendant, Constance Elizabeth Patton (R-168) was substantially
submitted by the court.

The Special Verdict form did not

separate general and special damages.
Plaintiff submits that an award of special damages
without general damages is inadequate as a matter of law.
Had the verdict form contained a place for the jury to award
both special and general damages, the verdict form, in that
event, would have shown zero dollars awarded as general
damages, which would have constituted an improper award and
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the trial court, pursuant to Rule 47(r) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, could have directed the jury to reconsider
their verdict and correct its impropriety.

Furthermore,

plaintiff is entitled to know exactly how much was awarded
as special damages and how much as general damages in any
event so that she may be awarded interest on the specials
pursuant to § 78-27-44 U.C.A. 1953, as amended as well as
for tax purposes and other reasons.
The discussion of the defendants insurance, or lack
of it (R. 236-238) , resulted in inadequate damages being
awarded to the plaintiff.

Both defendants were young,

attractive and had married between the time of the accident
and the date of the trial (Tr. 665, 633).

It may be reasonabi

to assume that the jury did not want to "punish" either of
the defendants financially, especially since the comments of
the jurors as reflected in the affidavit of plaintiff's
counsel (R. 236-238), indicated that they did not believe
that there was insurance coverage and therefore, the amount
of any judgement would have to be borne by the defendants
themselves.

The discussion of lack of insurance by the

three jurors was prejudicial and denied plaintiff a fair
trial.
The instructions given by the court placed undue emphasi
upon the plaintiff's burden of proof and made it difficult
if not impossible, for her to sustain the extra burden both
with regard to liability and damages.

The trial court
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should have taken extra care and precaution to insure that
duplicitious instructions on the same general areas of the
law submitted by two separate defendants were not given.
The instructions given tilted the scales against the plaintiff
and prevented a fair trial.
In the event that this court does not see fit to remand
this case for a new trial on the merits, plaintiff-appellant
submits that the trial court should be ordered to amend its
judgrnent_to allow interest on the total award as special
damages at eight percent (8%) per annum from the date of the
accident.

The statutory right to interest is a procedural

legislative mandate effective at the time the judgment was
rendered.
DATED at Provo, Utah this

/Oftt

day of May, 1978.

Respectfully submitted,

()(1{9 /f£1. cR~
Craig M. Snyder, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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